

Online Appendices for:
Small boats, long conflicts
The impact of maritime operations on insurgency duration

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A Coding Rules

Smuggling

- Source discusses use of boats for smuggling or transporting of arms, people, narcotics, etc. against the will of the state
- Source suggests that the boats are owned and operated by the insurgency, associated groups, or supporters

Maritime terrorism

- Source discusses guerrilla naval actions, including attacking government naval vessels, or attacking ports
- Source discusses bombing of civilian maritime targets, such as transport vessels, ferries, or attacking infrastructure

Piracy

- Source suggests pirate vessels are owned and operated by the insurgent group or associated groups
- Piracy events are: unlawful depredation at sea involving the use or threat of violence possibly, but not necessarily involving robbery
- Events are at sea and not in port

Brown-water Source describes the location of the maritime action as being on a lake or river

Green-water Source describes the location of the maritime action as being along the shore or near ports

Blue-water Source describes the location of the maritime action as being in the open ocean, blue water, or out to sea

Underwater operations

- Source describes or portrays insurgent groups as conducting open-circuit or closed-circuit diving
- Source describes or portrays insurgent groups operating submersibles

B Controls

In order to isolate the effect of the maritime campaign, I applied eleven control variables common to insurgency research.

GDPPC Higher gross domestic product per capita (GDPPC) provide insurgent groups greater access to financial resources to fund their insurgencies. Fearon and Latin (2003) found an additional \$1000 in GDPPC is associated with a 35% reduction in the onset of civil war. This variable is taken from the World Bank GDPPC data closest to the conflict’s initiation. I use logged GDPPC because the minimum and maximum score differ by three orders of magnitude.¹

Population Insurgencies in countries with greater population recruit from a larger pool. A large population also makes it more challenging for the incumbent regime to isolate the insurgency. This variable comes from the World Bank’s population closest to the conflict’s beginning. I use logged population because the minimum and maximum scores differ by five orders of magnitude.²

Ruggedness Countries with mountainous terrain are more likely to be weak states with insurgencies. This variable is the national variance in ruggedness drawn from the work of Andrew Shaver et al.³

Ethnic fractionalization Countries with a large number of ethnic groups may have greater internal conflict as those groups compete. This variable is sourced from the replication data from Fearon and Latin (2003).⁴

Secessionist Insurgencies with the goal of territorial secession are associated with greater success. This variable is organic to the UCDP dataset.

Foreign Support Foreign support provides insurgencies greater resources and escalates the conflict. This variable is based on the research of Elbadawi and Sambanis, who an association between foreign support and increased duration.^{5,6} I based this variable on whether there was a second party on the insurgency side in the UCDP dataset.

Democracy Democratic nations are more likely to conclude conflicts by incorporating the demands of the insurgent group. This variable is drawn from the Polity project’s polity2 score. Countries with polity2 scores above seven at the beginning of the conflict are considered democracies.⁷

Anocracy Anocratic regimes are thought to lack the resources or political strength to overcome insurgency.^{8,9}

Average annual defense spending per capita Greater defense spending per capita indicates stronger regime capacity to combat insurgency. I developed this variable by taking the natural log of the average defense spending per person. This measure also proxies for naval capacity on the assumption that some portion of greater defense spending will be allocated to naval spending, especially if the country faced a maritime insurgency. Modern data for this variable comes from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, with figures before 1970 from the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Science Research’s Military Defense Expenditure Data.^{10,11} I use logged average defense spending per person because the minimum and maximum score differ by four orders of magnitude.

¹Fearon and Laitin 2003.

²*World Development Indicators*| *World DataBank* 2016.

³Shaver, Andrew, David B. Carter, and Tsering W. Shawa. 2016.

⁴Fearon and Laitin 2003.

⁵Elbadawi 2000.

⁶Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl 2009.

⁷Center for Systemic Peace and Societal-Systems Research Inc 2016.

⁸Fearon and Laitin 2003.

⁹Center for Systemic Peace and Societal-Systems Research Inc 2016.

¹⁰SIPRI 2009.

¹¹Gillespie and Zinnes 1984.

Neighboring Insurgency Insurgencies cluster in different regions, sharing resources, sanctuary, and logistic networks. This control tackles the spatial autocorrelation of insurgency using a dummy variable of there was at least one insurgency in a neighboring country.

Median distance capital to conflict Insurgencies further from centers of power are more likely to persist because they less frequently threaten regime survival. I developed this measure by taking the natural log of the median distance from the national capital to UCDP geo-located insurgency events using geospatial packages for r statistical software. Buhaug et al. found that a similar measure significantly predicted insurgency duration.¹² I use logged distance because the minimum and maximum score differ by three orders of magnitude.

¹²Buhaug, Gates, and Lujala 2009.

C Robustness Checks

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Maritime Insurgency	-1.403** (0.715)	-1.305** (0.718)	0.006 (1.306)		
Piracy			-1.315* (0.715)		
Smuggling			0.741 (1.047)		
Maritime Terrorism				-0.289 (0.731)	
Brown Water				-1.900 (1.140)	
Green Water				1.023 (1.331)	
Blue Water					-0.016 (0.666)
Coastal Insurgency				0.148 (0.276)	0.066 (0.256)
ln(GDPPC)	0.130 (0.272)	0.149 (0.274)	0.173 (0.290)	0.148 (0.276)	0.066 (0.256)
ln(Population)	-0.435** (0.298)	-0.318 (0.331)	-0.264 (0.339)	-0.515 (0.390)	-0.119 (0.299)
Ruggedness	-0.955* (0.424)	-0.971** (0.415)	-0.662 (0.443)	-0.821* (0.383)	-0.835 (0.399)
Ethnic Fractionalization	-3.079** (1.332)	-2.980** (1.319)	-3.310* (1.604)	-3.922 (1.707)	-2.084 (1.260)
Secessionist	0.195 (0.537)	0.109 (0.544)	0.130 (0.569)	0.174 (0.543)	0.070 (0.562)
Foreign Support	1.309** (0.699)	1.034 (0.784)	0.851 (0.794)	0.710 (0.793)	0.273 (0.738)
Democracy	-0.416 (1.031)	-0.728 (1.130)	-0.421 (1.296)	0.033 (1.313)	-1.029 (1.195)
Anocracy	-0.009 (0.697)	-0.108 (0.692)	0.123 (0.750)	-0.185 (0.769)	-0.137 (0.682)
ln(average annual defense spending per capita)	0.701*** (0.232)	0.584** (0.262)	0.589* (0.270)	0.708 (0.317)	0.399 (0.238)
Neighboring Conflict	0.358 (0.959)	0.341 (0.954)	0.476 (0.997)	0.795 (1.130)	-0.091 (0.911)
ln(median distance capital to conflict)	0.041 (0.229)	0.022 (0.224)	0.019 (0.233)	0.013 (0.219)	0.015 (0.253)
Regional Fixed Effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	110	104	104	104	104
R ²	0.354	0.351	0.351	0.348	0.326
Max. Possible R ²	0.880	0.884	0.884	0.884	0.884
Log Likelihood	-92.467	-89.563	-89.553	-89.799	-91.472
Wald Test	103.230*** (df = 16)	96.100*** (df = 16)	155.700*** (df = 18)	259.520*** (df = 18)	139.030*** (df = 16)
LR Test	48.038*** (df = 16)	44.909*** (df = 16)	44.931*** (df = 18)	44.439*** (df = 18)	41.093*** (df = 16)
Score (Logrank) Test	67.756*** (df = 16)	63.624*** (df = 16)	65.136*** (df = 18)	63.221*** (df = 18)	61.241*** (df = 16)

Note:

Regression 1 includes cases excluded for not meeting the definition of insurgency, such as Al-Qaeda. Regressions 2-5 use the same controls as regressions 2-5 in Table ?? but also include regional fixed effects.

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01

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